Cases Dealing With Support For Non-Minor Children

Cases Dealing With This Code Section

Change in Circumstances

Educational Expenses

Effect of Amendments
The 1999 amendment by P.A.91-204, effective January 1, 2000, inserted the last two paragraphs in subsection 9a); and in subsection (b) inserted “or pursuant to a petition or motion to decrease, modify, or terminate any such award” in the introductory paragraph and added item (4).
The 2002 amendment by P.A. 92-876, effective June 1, 2003, in subsection (a)(2) substituted “age of 19” for “age of 18” in the second sentence.

Constitutionality
This section does not violate the equal protection guarantees of the U.S. or Illinois Constitution. Kujawinski v. Kujawinski

In General
The general rule is that child support terminates when a child reaches the age of 18 when the child has attained majority and becomes emancipated. In re Ferraro
This section authorizes the trial court to make provisions for the education and maintenance of children after they have attained the age of majority. Falat v. Falat
The trial court has the authority to make an equitable contingency provision for the education of a child during and beyond her minority. In re Block
The fact that a child may be emancipated does not preclude the court from ordering the payment of educational expenses. In re Greenberg
The trial court is empowered to provide for the education and maintenance of non-minor children as equity may require after considering, among other things, the financial resources of both parents and the financial resources of the child. In re Fleming

Attorney Fees
Respondent was ordered to pay petitioner’s attorney’s fees, necessitated by respondent’s noncompliance with an agreement to pay for his child’s college education. In re Houston

Bankruptcy Proceedings
Attorney’s fee award in paternity action was a support debt under 11 U.S.C. § 5220(f)(1)(A). In re Allen

Change in Circumstances

In General
The factors set out in this section are irrelevant in enforcement proceedings, and are likewise irrelevant in a modification proceeding; the pertinent question in determining whether to grant a petition for modification of a provision for payment of college expenses is the same as that on a petition to modify any other support term, that is, whether the petitioner has shown a substantial change in circumstances. In re Loffredi

Child Support

Award Upheld
The trial court’s award of child support extending beyond the majority of each child, if the child reached majority before leaving school, was not erroneous. In re Coram

Duration
An order under this section for education and maintenance of a child, whether of minor or majority age, is intended to be included within 750 ILCS 5/510(c)as a support order and is not terminated by the death of a parent obligated to pay for these expenses. DeFrancesca v. Estate of Champagne

Where a stipulation and agreed order did not contain any language limiting the obligation to pay a non-minor child’s college education expense to the decedent’s lifetime, the order did not terminate upon the decedent’s death, and his estate was responsible for these expenses. DeFrancesca v. Estate of Champagne

Obligation
The obligation of a parent to support his or her minor child begins when the child is born and continues until the child attains majority. In re Holderrieth

A parent cannot bargain away his or her obligation child support. In re Holderrieth
Even if the change of name was granted to the child, who resided with her mother and her mother’s new husband, her father must continue to support and educate her, extending through college. In re Omelson

This section has been interpreted as obligating the parents to extend support only during a child’s minority or other dependency. In re Stribling

Parent’s Liability
A parent’s liability for child support continues during the minority of a child, which ends at age 18. Prenzler v Prenzler

Disability

In General
Guardian’s claims against the guardian’s ex-husband’s estate on behalf of the guardian’s disabled daughter pursuant to 750 ILCS 5/510 and 750 ILCS 5/513 were properly found to be time-barred under 755 ILCS 5/18-12, as the guardian filed the claims more than two years after the ex-husband’s death, and neither a similar timely claim filed in California, nor the daughter’s mental disability, pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/13-208, -211, tolled the statute of limitations. Epsteen v. Epsteen

An allegedly disabled adult child is not a necessary party to a proceeding by the child’s custodial parent for child support. Lerner v. Lerner

A probate court’s determination of disability is not required by the statute, and a domestic relations judge has the power to make a determination of disability pursuant to a petition under the statute. Lerner v. Lerner

Not Shown
It was an abuse of discretion to award non-minor child support on the basis that the parties’ 20-year-old son was mentally disabled, notwithstanding testimony that he was a slow learner and had an IQ bordering on below average, where he graduated from high school in four years, received relatively high grades, tested in the nineteenth percentile on the ACT, was accepted in junior college, and was able to obtain employment to earn money to assist in his post secondary education. In re Thurmond

Educational Expenses

In General
“Support” is simply a general term that can include educational expenses for a child who has turned 18 but is still in high school, and educational expenses may include room and board, just as the more generic term, support, may include shelter and food; a trial court can award support to disabled un-emancipated children, minor or non-minor under 750 ILCS 5/513(a)(1), and a particular kind of support, educational expenses, to non-minor children in school under 750 ILCS 5/513(a)(2). In short, if the child has attained majority, the trial court must turn to § 513 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILCS 5/513, when deciding whether to award support for that non-minor child. Waller v. Waller

In General
Dissolution agreement that provided husband would pay one-half of child’s college expenses, but was silent as to a specific price or method by which a specific price would be determined, implied that the price for college expenses would be reasonable. In re Schmidt

The determination of educational expenses is in the trial court’s discretion. In re Zukausky

Trial court is authorized to require either or both parents to contribute to the college education expenses of their children. Blisset v. Blisset

A divorce decree may require a parent to provide for a child’s education expenses beyond the age of majority. Prenzler v. Prenzler

Ability to Pay
Where the court properly considered the necessary factors, its determination that the husband would assume responsibility for 75% of the parties’ sons’ college education was not an abuse of discretion. In re Olson

A party’s ability to pay must be evaluated with regard to the party’s resources at the time of the hearing. In re Calisoff

The trial court abused its discretion in making respondent solely responsible for his children’s college expenses for four years, excluding grants or scholarships, considering respondent’s adverse financial position after the disposition of marital property and petitioner’s ability to contribute to such education. In re Calisoff

Where wife had the training and rehabilitative capacity to earn a sum of money which, when combined with $9,000 unallocated maintenance, was substantially similar to husband’s income; the trial court’s equal division of responsibility for 21 year-old son’s pharmacy school costs was not an abuse of discretion. In re Albiani
The court should not order a party to pay more for educational expenses than he or she can afford. In re Pearson

The trial court’s refusal to allocate the college expenses of the minor child between the parties was not erroneous because rather than allocating amounts between the parties, both parties would be held responsible in accordance with their financial abilities at the time the child enrolled at a college. In re Kaplan
It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to hear defendant’s relevant testimony concerning his financial obligations to his second family. Greiman v. Friedman

Considering the great disparities in incomes between the parties, child’s tuition and books, along with the cost of his college and professional education, should be paid by the father and not be included as part of the $1,000 per month child support. In re Edelstein

Application
There is no indication in this section that the child himself must make the application for educational expenses but one of the parties could make it on his behalf providing the court considers the resources of both parties in ordering payment. Wait v. Wait

An application for educational expenses pursuant to this section is considered a modification of a divorce decree even if the decree contained no provision requiring either party to contribute to their children’s college education. Wait v. Wait

Award Denied
Where a divorce decree did not provide support for the educational expenses of the parties’ non-minor children and stated that the question of educational expenses was to be reserved for future consideration, and the support awarded in the decree was support for the three minor children, this type of support terminated when the children were emancipated and the divorce decree did not obligate the father to continue paying child support after the youngest child attained majority. In re Pauley

Denial of the petition that divorced husband pay college expenses of the children was not abuse of discretion where respondent’s testimony indicated that his expenses were in excess of his take-home pay was unrebutted and there was no contention that the deductions used in arriving at his net income or the amounts claimed as living expenses were improperly considered. Singer v. Singer
Where the decree did not mention college education, but rather required husband to make support payments for his minor children, and husband asserting that obligation ended at age 18 was entitled to a hearing on the merits for substantial justice was not done between the parties when the default judgment was entered for the wife. Prenzler v. Prenzler

Award Upheld
The circuit court order, which ordered the respondent to pay the parties’ daughter’s book costs, tuition, and fees, did not constitute an abuse of discretion where the court followed the order relied upon by the parties and gave their daughter the funds she needed to repay school loans and deliver her from the burden of substantial debt as a consequence of having pursued her college education. Hupe v. Hupe

Award Upheld
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering ex-husband to pay only his daughter’s future college tuition, books, and supplies, without reimbursing his ex-wife for their daughter’s first-year college expenses or any of their son’s college expenses. In re Pearson

Where child did not abandon his education but merely suspended it, testified that he planned to resume his college education in the near future, saved money he was earning, along with other money paid to him by his father and where father had the ability to pay child’s educational expenses, mother also contributed to child’s education by supporting him while he lived with her and the court ordered the money to be put in a separate account to protect child’s best interests, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay arrearages and continue educational support to child Alltop v. Alltop

The circuit court was well within its discretion in ordering plaintiff to make payments for college expenses which would not require his son to go into substantial debt to procure a college education. Gibb v. Triezenberg
Where husband and wife owned a house and property valued approximately $200,000, of which husband was awarded 50% and husband and his present wife owned real estate with a net equity of about $40,000; where he had stock in a restaurant in which he invested $20,000 and owned a construction company; and where husband had outstanding loans, it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence for a trial court to conclude that husband had sufficient property and income to contribute $6,000 toward his daughter’s first year of college. Larsen v. Larsen

Where agreements incorporated into the original decree of divorce authorized defendant to direct the secular and religious education of the children, but also provided that defendant’s responsibility for his children’s college and post-graduate education was to be consistent with the abilities and wishes of the children, defendant was required to pay his son’s future college expenses even at a school not of defendant’s choice. Willcuts v. Willcuts

The court properly ordered that divorce decree be modified to require defendant to pay plaintiff $100 per month over a four year period while his daughter, age 17, was pursuing an education, and that he pay in installments to plaintiff $400 out of $631 incurred for medical expenses. O’Berry v. O’Berry

Burden of Proof
Husband did not need to present his own evidence to meet his burden of proof in challenging the reasonableness of the price of a college where the party’s child did not provide meaningful reasons for her choice of a private school over state schools; husband needed only to show the costs of the state schools and his finances. In re Schmidt

The trial court did not err in ruling that the husband failed to sustain his burden of proof under this section where no evidence the time the children were in college, the standard living either the time the children were in college, the standard of living either child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved, or the children’s financial resources other than the son’s current income and expenses, and the evidence that was introduced indicated that most of the son’s educational expenses were paid by his grandfather without contribution by the wife. Rosche v. Rosche

Ex-wife had the burden of proving that ex-husband should contribute toward the college expenses of the two children and of proving how much his share should be; the financial resources of the parties and the children must be considered by the trial court in deciding this issue; ex-wife established a prima facie case by introducing evidence that the children’s income were nominal, that ex-husband earned $24,526 net annually and that she had no income but had previously earned $8,112 net annually; ex-husband therefore had the burden of going forward with evidence that would at least equally balance ex-wife’s evidence. In re Taylor

Child’s Resources
In view of the equitable considerations mandated by this section and the fact that the child lived with petitioner and was employed, court should have considered the contribution that the child was able to make toward financing the first year of his education, particularly since the chosen institution was not an educational facility supported by the state, where as a state resident he could have availed himself of the in-state tuition fee. In re Brust

College or University
Where flight instruction, as well as the resulting “flight costs”, was an integral part of the curriculum, for all majors, at the college of airway sciences at the University of North Dakota and even though child elected to pursue a degree in airway sciences and incurred costs in connection with flight instruction required by that program, the program leads to a bachelor’s degree and incorporates traditional liberal arts courses into its requirements; accordingly, the school at issue was a “college or university” as contemplated by the marital settlement agreement and respondent was required to pay for flight costs in connection with his child’s education. In re Dieter

An institute of technology offering a baccalaureate degree in four academic areas and requiring students to take traditional liberal arts courses such as English composition, speech, and writing was a college or university for the purposes of fulfilling a settlement agreement. In re Oldham

Contempt
Respondent’s noncompliance with the provision of the dissolution judgment requiring him to pay his daughter’s college expenses constituted prima facie evidence of contempt. In re Houston

Disability Not Required
There is no requirement that an emancipated child be mentally or physically disabled where the support ordered is for education and maintenance expenses. In re Taylor

Duty to Pay
This section does not mandate divorced parents to provide funds for their children’s post-secondary education; a determination as to whether a parent shall contribute is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and even then, a child cannot force his parents to provide funds if both parents agree that such funds will not be provided. In re Kuhn

Under this section, it is clear that a court, acting upon the petition of one former spouse, may order the former spouse to assume all or a portion of the college expenses incurred by the couple’s child. Miller v. Miller

The expense of providing a college education for a child who is no longer a minor is not a burden that every parent is required to assume, but rather it is a matter for discretion of the trial court in each case. In re Stribling

Duty to Pay
There is no absolute duty for a father to pay college expenses; such a duty is created only by a trial court’s order, after a hearing, either to enforce an agreement between the parties or to create a post-divorce decree duty, upon proper petition of a party. Greiman v. Friedman

This section and 750 ILCS 5/503 do not mandate that divorced parents must provide their children of majority age with funds for education in all cases; however, it is certainly a legitimate legislative purpose for the legislature to furnish a means for providing that they do so after they have been divorced. Kujawinski v. Kujawinski

Emancipation
Trial court abused its discretion in failing to comply with §§ 510(a) and 513 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILCS 5/510(a) and 513, before extending the termination date of a support order to provide child support for an 18-year-old until his graduation from high school. Waller v. Waller

Factors Considered
In determining a reasonable price for college expenses where the obligation to pay these expenses have been provided for in a settlement agreement, the court may use the factors in subsection (b). In re Schmidt

In deciding whether to increase husband’s payments for child’s education the trial court could consider that when the child came home, she would bring the dirty laundry to petitioner, not respondent, and if she brought home friends, they would stay with petitioner, not respondent. In re Korte

While the lack of a parent-child relationship would not, of itself, terminate the parent’s obligation to pay college expenses; the circuit court could, and perhaps should, have considered that factor in addition to the factors enumerated in this section. Gibb v. Triezenberg

In determining the respective responsibility of each party, the trial court should consider the children’s access to less expensive academic institutions. In re Calisoff

The trial court properly considered the parties’ educational expenditures on their other children prior to the dissolution. In re Pearson

Factors Considered
While in some instances it may be proper for the court to provide for a child’s attendance at a private school, the child’s access to a less expensive public institution is a factor to be considered. In re Pearson

In making awards of education and maintenance the court shall consider all relevant factors, including: the financial resources of both parents, the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved, and the financial resources of the child. Larsen v. Larsen

In determining maintenance award, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to consider the current lifestyle of the first wife, and her family and to include the educational expenses of their non-minor child, in its determination of maintenance. In re Belluomini

A student’s academic record is merely one relevant factor, under this section for the court to consider in assessing educational expenses. Greiman v. Friedman
Where one daughters’ performance extended her schooling needs by an extra semester, yet she maintained a “B” average, her overall performance was not so poor that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in requiring her father to contribute to one final semester, nor did the court abuse its discretion by requiring a second daughter to maintain at least “C” average. Greiman v. Friedman
A court may consider the private/public school issue as a relevant factor under this section. Greiman v. Friedman

Remarriage and subsequent birth of a child are factors to be taken into account together with all other circumstances. Greiman v. Friedman

Because it is likely that both parties pool their resources with those of their second spouses, so that their assets and liabilities are substantially intertwined, the parties should be allowed to submit detailed information of their finances so the court may reach a more principled and more equitable determination of the share that each party should contribute. Greiman v. Friedman

Financial Resources
Income and assets of mother’s new husband were not relevant to father’s contribution to son’s college educational expenses, but should have been considered in determining how they were or could have been used to contribute to mother’s living expenses. Street v. Street

In determining the financial resources available to a custodial mother, the court properly considered her new husband’s income where she testified that she and new current husband pooled their income and money to pay their family expenses. In re Drysch

Illegitimate Children
In a parentage proceeding, it is proper to apply this section so as to provide for the education of a non-minor, illegitimate child as equity requires, effectuating the legislative intent to treat all children equally in matters of support, such intent being manifested in section 3 of the Parentage Act (750 ILCS 45/3). Rawles v. Hartman

Illustrative Cases
It was an abuse of discretion to order the father to pay 70 percent of the college expenses of son where the father had insufficient income to meet his monthly obligations. In re Thurmond

The trial court correctly determined that respondent was under a legal duty to provide for the maximum amount of his child’s future education expenses in accordance with the marital settlement agreement. In re Dieter

When the court determines parental responsibility for educational expenses, it is not mandatory that the trial court order that child’s expenses be shouldered by father; the trial court ordered father to pay for child’s entire cost of schooling, plus an additional amount as maintenance and medical and dental insurance including all deductibles but not mother’s calculations which included her mortgage payment, homeowner’s insurance, and other costs which she would have to pay whether child lived at home or not. In re Hillebrand

Living Expenses Included
Educational expenses entitle a mother to receive reasonable living expenses in addition to the cost of tuition and books when the children are residing at home while attending college. Falat v. Falat

Modification
A court order providing for the education of the child even after he reaches the age of majority is modifiable at all times, as he reaches the age of majority is modifiable at all times, as changing circumstances warrant. In re Holderrieth
Denial of the petition that a divorced husband pay college the expenses of the children was not an abuse of discretion where the respondent’s testimony indicating that his expenses were in excess of his take-home pay was unrebutted and there was no contention that the diction used in arriving at his net income or the amounts claimed as living expenses were improperly considered. Singer v. Singer

Modification
Where the trial court ordered both parties to contribute one-half of the college expenses of their daughter, but limited plaintiff’s expenditures to $1,000, and the financial circumstances of the parties did not differ so greatly as to justify a limitation on the support obligation of one party and to the other, the judgment had to be modified to remove the limitation placed upon plaintiff’s educational support obligation. Harnois v. Harnois

A Court properly exercised its discretion under former section 19 of the Divorce Act to increase the amount of child support to provide for an adult child’s educational expenses where the father was financially capable of providing for such expenses (see now 750 ILCS 5/510 and this section). Maitzen v. Maitzen

Non-custodial Decreased Parent
Under 750 ILCS 5/510(d) and this section, the circuit court may not enter an order against the estate of non-custodial decreased parent for the payment of college expenses of a non-minor child when there no such previous obligation was imposed upon the parent to be charged prior to his death. Treacy v. Treacy

Pending Marriage Dissolution
The trial court properly denied ordering ex-husband to reimburse ex-wife for the children’s high school expenses while the dissolution of marriage was pending in court. In re Pearson

Relationship of Parent and Child
A child’s relationship to his or her parent is not relevant in determining to what extent the parent should pay the child’s educational expenses. In re Drysch

Settlement Agreement
A settlement agreement which made provisions for the college expenses of the son, rather than this section, controlled the disposition of the case because the parties in a dissolution proceeding may voluntarily settle their property interest. In re Holderrieth

The parties’ mutual adjustment of their marital rights so far as the education of their children was concerned was conclusive in the absence of un-conscionability, fraud, coercion, duress or a violation of public policy or morals. In re Holderieth

Settlement Agreement
Where under the settlement agreement, father’s obligation to pay for daughter’s college education was limited to a reasonable price, the order which set his obligation at a price which was not unreasonably low was upheld on a contract theory; moreover, under this section, the trial court’s order was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Ingrassia v. Ingrassia

The “educational expenses” clause in a property distribution settlement was not an express agreement obligating either party to pay specific expenses; the clause did no more than to reserve until a later date the question of educational expenses under this section. In re Pearson

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering husband to pay toward his daughter’s first year of college without directly receiving testimony regarding wife’s finances where the clear intent of a divorce decree which incorporated a property settlement agreement was that the husband would bear the burden of his daughter’s college expenses if he was financially able to do so. Larsen v. Larsen
Where the obligation to provide for a child’s college expenses is included in a property settlement agreement which is later incorporated in a divorce decree, the obligation to provide for a child’s education embodied in this section is said to be even more definite and obligatory. Larsen v. Larsen

Shortages
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a $3,500 shortage of child’s education fund where she needed $7,000 and the grants she received provided only $3,648.90 and raising father’s payments to cover this shortage. In re Korte

Standing
A child of divorced parents does not have standing to bring a separate action in his own name to enforce the provisions of his parent’s divorce decree with regard to payment of college expenses. Miller v. Miller

Only parties to the divorce may petition the court for relief under the support provisions of the Act; a court may provide for the education of a child of divorced parents under this paragraph only upon petition of one of the child’s parents. Miller v. Miller

Trust
The trial court could impose a trust for future expenditures for the children’s college educations even though there was no evidence that the children would even attend college upon becoming of age to do so. In re Harsy

A court does have the discretion to order the establishment of a trust for a child’s future educational expenses while he or she is of minority age if there is evidence showing a need to protect the interests of the child. In re Harsy

The establishment of trust funds for children’s future educational needs was necessary to promote and protect the minor children’s interests, and the court did not abuse its discretion when it so ordered where the evidence revealed that the father was of the opinion that further education was not something to be valued, and because of his opinion, it could be inferred that he would not take measures to assure that there would be funds available for that purpose. In re Harsy

Father was ordered to establish an educational trust where there was evidence in the record that the respondent had upon one occasion been held in contempt of court for failing to pay his child support as ordered by the court, which indicated that the respondent had either been unable or unwilling to pay. In re Harsey

Unaccredited Religious School
Divorced father was not required to pay college expenses for emancipated child where she enrolled in an unaccredited religious school whose credits were nontransferable and where she expressed n o desire to pursue a religious vocation but testimony indicated that she would probably go to a secular school after bible college even though there were questions whether any of her credits would transfer. In re Spear

Waiver
A custodial parent could not waive a child’s claim to college expenses in a property settlement agreement with the non-custodial parent; parents cannot bargain away the child’s right under the agreement without benefit to the child, without judicial approval, and without means available to the child to judicially contest the parents’ agreement in violation of the Illinois law. Miller v. Miller

Effect of Amendment

Educational Expense Guidelines
When the legislature amended this section, effective January 1, 1993, it did not adopt the guidelines of section 505 (750 ILCS 5/505) but rather continued to require courts to consider the relevant factors as were previously used in the statute. In re Hillebrand

Emancipation

By Marriage
A parent’s obligation to pay for the educational expenses of a child terminated upon the marriage of that child, an emancipating event. In re Daniels

This section does not allow for provision for college expenses and maintenance of a child to be made even if the child is emancipated other than by age. In re Walters

Not Shown
Respondent’s obligation to provide maintenance and to pay for college expenses of his daughters terminated when the children became emancipated through marriage; however, as to one of respondent’s daughters, she was not emancipated by her marriage because she continued to live at home and be supported by her mother and because her marriage was eventually declared invalid. In re Walters

Enforcement of Decree

Adult Child
An adult child of divorced parents has standing to enforce the educational provision of a divorce decree on the basis that he or she is a third-party beneficiary. Orr v. Orr

Jurisdiction
A provision in a dissolution judgment for the payment of a child’s college expenses is a term in the nature of child support, and the circuit court therefore retains jurisdiction to modify such a provision at any time pursuant to 750 ILCS 5/502 and 750 ILCS 5/510, regardless of whether the provision was ordered by the court under this section or incorporated into the judgment as a result of a settlement agreement. In re Loffredi

The court had continuing personal jurisdiction over the respondent for purposes of former wife’s petition to require the respondent to contribute to son’s college expenses due to his continuing support obligation for the minor daughter of the parties. Wait v. Wait

Jurisdiction
The courts have jurisdiction to order support payments for the education of children, regardless of whether the children are minors or adults and regardless of whether the petition is filed before or after the attainment of majority. Stecher v. Stecher

Legislative Intent
The legislative intent of this section was to furnish a means to provide for the education of children of divorced parents. Treach v. Treacy

Matters Pertaining to Children

College Expenses
A provision for the payment of a child’s college expenses is a matter pertaining to children and in the nature of child support. In re Loffredi

Medical and Dental Expenses
The court abused its discretion in ordering the husband to pay child’s medical and dental expenses until she reached the age of emancipation or graduated from college, whichever occurred last, as the court’s order was not limited to the period in which a duty of support existed under this section and would require the husband to pay all medical and dental expenses of his adult daughter even if she was not disabled or then attending school, but self-supporting out of her income producing assets. In re Block

Modification of Order
Orders entered pursuant to this section are always modifiable. In re Loffredi

Modification of Payments
In all cases where petitions to modify payments under a divorce decree are involved, the primary question is whether or not changes in circumstances of the parties justify the modification. Bulmer v. Bulmer

Out of Property

Defined
The words “out of property” as used in this section in sufficiently broad and encompassing so as to include income from wages, profit from investments, property holdings and the ownership of other assets and resources of value. Faust v. Faust

Purpose
The purpose of this section is to furnish a means to provide for the education of children of divorced parents. In re Kohn

Review
Since respondent had not provided the court with a record petitioner contribute to daughter’s education expenses, the court could not determine if there was an abuse of discretion. In re Betts

The trial court’s discretion will not be interfered with in the absence of an abuse of that discretion or unless a manifest injustice has been done. In re Ingrassia
Where the trial court had the discretionary power, based upon the law and the evidence presented, to decide the issue of the respondent’s responsibility to contribute to the technical school expenses of his adult child, the evidence indicated that the trial court exercised its discretion properly and that its determination was not at all contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Faust v. Faust

An abuse of discretion in not awarding money for maintenance and educational expenses will not be found unless the record demonstrates that the financial resources of both parents, the standard of living during the marriage and the financial resources of the child were such as to require a party to provide for the education and maintenance of his non-minor children. In re Gardner

Settlement Agreement

Held Modifiable
The trial court erred in finding that a provision in a dissolution judgment which provided for the payment of children’s college expenses was not modifiable when that provision was contained in a settlement agreement incorporated into the judgment and the agreement specifically precluded modification of its terms. In re Loffredi

Unilateral Reduction
Absent an express or implied court0ordered provision, a parent who pays collective or lump-sum child support payments for the support of two or more children may not unilaterally reduce the amount of that payment pro rata as each child becomes emancipated. Clay v. Clay

Valuation
Where the related issues of maintenance to petitioner and the minor child and the payment of educational expenses were directly affected by the final property disposition since these awards were substantially dependent upon the financial resources of the parties, including marital property (750 ILCS 5/504(b)(1), 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(2), 750 ILCS5/508(a) and this section, the maintenance and support awards would have to be re-evaluated by the trial court on remand so that it may properly consider any changes required in the disposition of such property. In re Walsh.

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Sec. 513. Support for Non-minor Children and Educational Expenses.