Property Disposition

Property Disposition

___In General
   The award of their interests in the home to the parties in the original dissolution of marriage judgment was a property disposition and not subject to modification as a form of child support.  In re Redmer
   Provisions of what is construed as a property settlement are not modifiable or revocable unless the court finds the existence of conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state.  In re Lowe

___Between Spouses
   It is improper to award the property in a divorce action to the children because the Act contemplates the division of marital property between the spouses.  The duty of support normally continues only during the minority of the child and there is no provision in the Act authorizing outright conveyance of marital property, even in trust, which is unrelated to a child’s support or maintenance.  In re Smith

___Changed Circumstances
   Where the award to wife of use of the marital residence was not a part the court’s property disposition, but was instead intended to be in the nature of an award of additional maintenance and child support, the duration of her occupancy was modifiable upon a showing of substantially changed circumstances.  In re Stanley

___Civil Procedure
   Under this Act, conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment under the law permit the revocation or modification of provisions as to property disposition.  In re Beck

___Consent Decree
   A consent decree regarding a property settlement did not affect the question of divorce, which was beyond the power of the parties the adjust by agreement or collusion, and as a contract, it was binding on the parties unless induced by fraud.  Garmisa v. Garmisa

___Credit
   Since the right to receive a past-due alimony payment and the right to be relieved of paying taxes on a marital home were similar in that both were economic benefits, a supplemental judgment for divorce was modified to give the plaintiff full credit for having paid the taxes when the marital home was sold.  Laing v. Laing

___Fraud or Coercion
   Generally, provisions as to property dispositions may not be modified, however, a settlement agreement will be set aside and vacated if procured by fraud, coercion, or if contrary to any rule of law, public policy, or morals.  In re Lipkin
   A decree disposing of property upon divorce, based upon a separation agreement procured by fraud or coercion, may be modified via a motion under 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 if the injured party acts with reasonable diligence.  In re Beck

___In Lieu of maintenance
   The husband’s assumption of car loan payments was in the nature of a property settlement in lieu of maintenance and did not terminate when the wife remarried, because the judgment provided that: the husband would pay the loan according to its current schedule; the loan was for a specific sum to be paid over a specific period of time; except for the husband’s payment of the marital debts, each party would surrender all claims to maintenance and all claims to the property of the other spouse; marital property was divided by a court giving consideration to whether the appointment was in lieu of maintenance; and neither the label attached nor the method of payment prescribed in the judgment conclusively determined the nature of the award.  In re Rowden

___Maintenance Distinguished
   The parties to a divorce intended that their agreement constitute a property settlement, where the agreement plainly provided that the payments were for and in consideration of the wife quitclaiming her interest in various pieces of marital property, both parties expressly waived all claims to alimony, and the agreement’s provision for a definite total sum was to be paid at the end of a definite period of time rather than on a periodic basis for an indefinite period of time which is characteristic of maintenance.  In re Lowe

___Marital Home
   Award of exclusive possession of the marital home to wife unambiguously constituted a property disposition which could not be modified and not an award of non-monetary child support or other modifiable subsidy.  Taber v. Taber

___Modification of Agreement
   The awarding of exclusive possession of the residence to petitioner was in the nature of a property settlement where this award was part of the paragraph awarding two parcels of real property, both previously owned in joint tenancy, to the respondent, in return for quitclaiming to respondent all her interests in the property, petitioner was allowed to remaining the premises unless she remarried; this conclusion is buttressed by the fact that a different paragraph of the decree provided for monetary payments to petitioner of up to $1,000 each year depending on respondent’s level of income, therefore, the trial court improperly modified a property settlement provision of the original divorce decree.  In re Christianson

___Modification Improper
   Husband’s obligation to pay the outstanding indebtedness on a house owed to bank amounted to a non-modifiable property settlement in lieu of maintenance, and was not periodic maintenance terminable on the wife’s remarriage.  In re Gallentine
   Provisions in a judgment of dissolution which constitute a disposition of property or property settlement are generally not modifiable or revocable as property rights created by such judgment become vested when judgment its final, therefore court lacks general jurisdiction to modify.  In re Hubbard
   Circuit court’s determination to modify the property settlement agreement requiring petitioner to pay the entire sum of the monthly mortgage payments as they came due was in error as a matter of law because the award was a property disposition and non0modifiable under subsection (a) of this sect.  In re Pitts
   Subsection 9a) of this section did not grant the trial court the broad authority upon which it relied to vary the terms of the initial marriage dissolution judgment.  In re Redmer
   Pursuant to section 18 of the former Divorce Act (see now this section), provisions respecting the disposition of the parties’ property incorporated in a divorce decree are not subject to modification, whether labeled a property settlement or an award of alimony in gross payable in installments.  Lamp v. Lamp

___Modification Proper
   Where petitioner did not contend that the trial court’s order was, in fact, a modification of maintenance or support, the order at issue could only affect the property disposition contained in the judgment; thus, the trial court had jurisdiction to enter an order modifying the property disposition only if conditions existed which would justify the reopening of a judgment as in other civil cases.  In re Hubbard

___Power of court
   In determining the propriety or impropriety of divorce decree ordering conveyance of property under former section 17 of the Divorce Act, the authority of the court was based upon powers conferred by statute rather than upon general equity powers.  Debrey v. Debrey

___Property Settlement Agreement
   When a party seeks to vacate or modify a property settlement incorporated in a divorce decree, all presumptions are in favor of the validity of the settlement.  Garmisa v. Garmisa

___Rent for Marital Home
   Where under the terms of a dissolution judgment, defendant had “the right to the exclusive possession of the marital home for a period of six years or until his remarriage,” and plaintiff moved to have defendant’s girl friend ousted from the marital residence to have the house sold pursuant to conditions set right in the dissolution judgment to collect certain rental payments for the period during which the girl friend lived with defendant in the house, the award of rental payments to plaintiff was plainly improper and would be set aside since the circuit court made no finding that the judgment should be reopened, and plaintiff never claimed that conditions existed which would have justified its being reopened.  Meyer v. Meyer

___Revestment
   The trial court, under the doctrine of revestment, had jurisdiction to modify a property disposition more than 30 days after entry of the original judgment without satisfying the requirements of this section.  Elmore v. Elmore

___Trust
   Trial court was not requ9ired to make a finding of special circumstances that a trust was necessary to protect and promote the best interests of the parties’ children before requiring husband to name wife as trustee for the benefit of their sons on husband’s life insurance policies for the benefit of the parties’ two sons until the completion of their college education or emancipation.  In re Olson

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