Removal of Child

Removal of Child

   Petitioner did not carry her burden of proving that moving child to Georgia would be in child’s best interest, but instead the evidence demonstrated that child’s visitation with respondent would decrease by at least 50% and her interaction with her relatives would also be significantly diminished; though the quality of child’s life in Georgia might possible be better in a material sense, it would be diminished in many important ways, and because child’s best interest was not reflected in trial court’s determination to permit removal of child from Illinois, it was found to be against the manifest weight of the evidence.  Tysl v. Levine
   In case where the parties were never married, the custodial parent is not required to file a petition for removal, thus, the court will not yet have engaged in a best interest of the child analysis to determine whether the custodial parent should be allowed to remove the minor child from the state, therefore, where the parties were never married, the fact that a custodial parent wishes to move out of the state with the minor child is sufficient to show a change of circumstances which would satisfy the first prong of 750 ILCS 5/610 and the court would then be required to engage in a best interests of the child analysis, utilizing the factors enumerated in this section.  In re R.M.F.
   It is the province of the trial court to determine whether removal of child from Illinois to Colorado would permit a degree of involvement and cooperation between parents and child that would foster their son’s physical, mental, moral and emotional well-being.  In re Bednar
   Where the father having custody of the minor child had moved to Mississippi with the child since the hearing, any modification of the custody order because of changes in circumstances arising since the hearing should have been initiated in the trial court pursuant to 750 ILCS 5/610.  Melear v. Melear
   For a case discussing custodial’s parent removal of children to another state, see Garland v. Garland.
   Subsequent to a divorce decree, the court granting such decree retains continuing jurisdiction of the parties with regard to children of the marriage, custody and support; a party may not avoid this continuing jurisdiction of the trial court which entered the original divorce decree by moving outside the court’s geographical jurisdiction.  Crawley v. Bauchens
   The best interests of the child required her expatriation with her mother in Germany for a period of 11 months and her return to the United States for one month in the summer, rather than living with the father in the United State because the mother had sufficient financial resources and was otherwise able to care for said child.  Radivojevic v. Radivojevic
   Under former Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 40, para.19 (1967) (see now this section), the removal of a child from the jurisdiction was not alone sufficient grounds for a change of custody.  Norris v. Norris
   The removal of the parties’ child to Ohio when the mother moved there with her second husband was not grounds for revoking her custody.  Jingling v. Trtanj
   The court should grant permission to take the children out of the jurisdiction if it is deemed to be for interests of the children; the court should make such provisions as are reasonably necessary to protect the rights given the father as the non-custodial parent in the divorce.  Trimble v. Trimble
   Custody of children may be awarded to a non-resident on a showing of circumstances which would better promote the welfare and interests of the children; all other considerations will be subordinate to the children’s welfare.  Trimble v. Trimble

Rotating Custody
   The trial court did not err in finding that the father met his burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence on the basis of new circumstances or previously unknown facts, and properly instituted a rotating custody arrangement and ongoing therapy in an attempt to break the cycle of parental alienation and to assist the parties’ child in her adjustment.  In re Divelbiss

Separation
   Keeping a family together is not an overriding factor when there is a substantial disparity in the ages of the siblings and other important factors are in the best interests of a young child.  In re Seymour
   It is usually in the best interests of the children that they not be separated; however, separation of the children may occasionally be in the children’s best interest.  In re Slavenas

Stability of Environment
   Stability of the home environment is a judicial gloss added to the factors specifically enumerated in this section.  In re Pool
   The trial court’s judgment modifying a minor’s custody from mother to father would not be overturned where it weighed the instability of the environment provided by the mother, her frequent changes in residence, her unsuccessful remarriage, her poor choice of male companions who associated with her in the presence of the child, and the fact that the mother was unemployed.  In re Padiak
   In a custody modification, the court can consider the stability of the children’s environment in judging their best interests.  De Franco v. De Franco
   Where the effect of the trial court’s order was to remove the child from an unstable home into a two-parent, stable atmosphere and to eliminate exposure to conditions which were not conducive to physical and moral well-being, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, nor was its judgment against the manifest weight of the evidence.  Sorenson v. Sorenson
   It was not an abuse of discretion to award custody of minor children tot the husband where the award of custody placed the children in a stable home, and in circumstances conducive to their emotional well-being.  O’Donnell v. O’Donnell
   Stability of environment is an important factor in determining the best interests and welfare of children; removal of a child to another state as a result of a modification of the decree, if it is in the best interest of the child, does not prohibit modification.  Cave v. Cave
   The law should not and does not demand that each individual shall attain the same level of achievement; rather, recognizing the physical, emotional, and mental differences in individuals, the law requires only that individuals shall attain a reasonable standard of decency, opportunity and respect so that his children may partake of that which society has to offer, subject only to his own individual limitations.  McAdams v. McAdams

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