Alimony

Alimony

___Binding
   Alimony provisions in a divorce decree are of a vested and binding character upon a defendant.  Hallett v. Hallett

___Cost of Living
   An increase in the cost of living, standing alone, has been repeatedly rejected as a sufficient reason to increase or augment alimony awards because inflation affects both parties rather than merely one spouse or the other.  Bellow v. Bellow

___In Gross
   Where defendant offered little evidence to show in what manner an award of alimony in gross (made under prior law) was so excessive as to constitute an abuse of discretion and plaintiff’s claim that the award was inadequate was equally unpersuasive, the trial court’s estimate of plaintiff’s actual needs was correct and not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence presented.  Lieberman v. Lieberman

___Modification
   A court was required to consider the conduct or condition in issue affecting modification of alimony only if it still occurred at the time of the petition or on or after the effective date of the Marriage Act.  Kowalski v. Kowalski
   For cases discussing modification of alimony, see Hickey v. Hickey.
   Where practically all of the living expenses of a paramour of a defendant’s spouse were provided by defendant, who received almost all of her income from the alimony, and defendant paid all of the taxes, utility bills, and insurance and provided almost all of the food for the paramour, then alimony was modified.  Hall v. Hall

___Separation Agreements
   When a trial court entered its decree for divorce and expressly approved the parties’ settlement agreement, it thereby incorporated into its decree the provisions of the agreement as to alimony.  The rights of the parties thereafter rested upon the decree and it was subject to modification by the court pursuant to former Ill. Rev. Stat., ch 40, para. 19 (see now this section).  Larson v. Larson

___Termination
   For cases discussing termination of alimony, see Pierce v. Pierce.
   Although a complete termination of alimony to the plaintiff was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion, the continued payment of $16,000 a year to a woman of the plaintiff’s means, after her brief marriage to the defendant, was not justified.  Borowitz v. Borowitz
   The trial court did not err in its judgment that plaintiff, by using the $1,000 in additional payments awarded to her as a condition to termination of alimony, could make herself employable either by undergoing surgery on her feet or by obtaining additional education, and that defendant’s remarriage, and the birth of a child from the new marriage, constituted substantial change of circumstances justifying termination of alimony.  Tan v. Tan
   Similar prior provision allowing the court to make reasonable and proper alterations in its alimony requirement also vested the court with ample power to declare the termination of all alimony upon the occurrence of facts reasonable justifying such a declaration.  Lennahan v. O’Keefe
   Absent unequivocal language that the court intended a spouse’s heirs to be bound by its alimony obligation terminated at paying spouse’s death.  Lennahan v. O’Keefe

Back to 750 ILCS 5/510 Home Page